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Abstract: This note reflects on the first ever European Animal Rights Law Conference, which was 
held in Cambridge, UK, from 14-15 September 2019. It situates the Conference in the broader context 
of the emerging academic discipline of animal rights law and shows that the Conference was unprec-
edented in its attempt to forge a new, European animal rights law.  
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Introduction 
From 14-15 September 2019, animal rights scholars and practitioners from all over Europe gathered 
at St Edmund’s College, Cambridge, for the first ever European Animal Rights Law Conference. The 
Conference, which was organized by the Cambridge Centre for Animal Rights Law, brought together 
experts from Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Israel, Poland, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the UK, 
and the US, in an unprecedented attempt to forge a new, European field of animal rights law.1 In this 
note, we reflect on the context of the Conference by showing that it is part of an ongoing revolution 
toward recognizing animals as holders of fundamental legal rights—a revolution that has seen the 
emergence of animal rights law as an academic discipline in its own right. We then point to the need 
to overcome old rifts in that discipline and end by proposing a pragmatic way forward.  
Taking Animal Rights Law Seriously: A Revolution 
There have been numerous animal law and animal ethics conferences before September 2019. In fact, 
many of the participants of the first European Animal Rights Law Conference had just days before 
attended the Animal Law, Ethics and Policy Conference organized at Liverpool John Moores Univer-
sity. Animal rights conferences are not a new phenomenon either. In the same year of our Cambridge 
Conference, for example, the ninth instalment of the International Animal Rights Conference took 
place in Luxembourg.  
What was new and special about the European Animal Rights Law Conference was that it was the 
first such event in Europe to focus entirely on animal rights law. It was the first conference, in other 
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words, which was dedicated to the study of legal fundamental rights of non-human animals and cog-
nate issues, such as legal personhood, constitutional rights, human rights, and the practical implemen-
tation of non-human rights.  
By contrast to the Conference itself, however, these issues are not without precedent. Over the past 
two decades, animal rights law has burgeoned into an academic discipline in its own right. More and 
more scholars have started to focus entirely on the question of animals’ fundamental legal rights rather 
than their moral rights (see e.g., Francione, 1996; Wise, 2000; Stucki, 2016a; Peters, 2018). Courses are 
being developed and taught that concentrate entirely on animals’ legal rights (see Animal Legal 
Defense Fund, 2019; UK Centre for Animal Law, 2019). And practicing lawyers are increasingly push-
ing for radical, rights-oriented change on the ground (see e.g., Nonhuman Rights Project, 2016; Stucki, 
2016b). The cases which these lawyers have brought were at the heart of our discussions at the Con-
ference. Among them was the ground-breaking Cecilia decision, which was the first in history to grant 
an animal—the chimpanzee Cecilia—a writ of habeas corpus and to declare her a legal person (Tercer 
Juzgado de Garantías, Mendoza, 2016).  
Lawyers studying the law pertaining to animals are of course not a new phenomenon. Animal welfare 
acts and accompanying scholarship and reform proposals go back two-hundred years in at least some 
European countries (Kelch, 2013). However, what is new is that lawyers are starting to see nonhuman 
animals as potential holders of legal personhood and of legal rights akin to the personhood and fun-
damental rights possessed by human animals. To adapt a phrase popularized by the legal philosopher 
Ronald Dworkin, we can say that lawyers are now taking animal rights seriously (see Dworkin, 2013). That 
is, they see animals as sentient subjects with astonishing capacities deserving of a strong legal status 
and legal entitlements that far surpass the protection these beings are currently granted in most legal 
systems. 
It is in this sense, we believe, that we are witnessing a revolution. To witness a revolution, or to be 
part of a revolution, does however not necessarily mean throwing overboard all legal instruments and 
concepts one has used thus far to protect animals, and to advocate the adoption of entirely new ones. 
As Aristotle tells us in his Politics, revolutions can happen when one system changes to another—for 
instance, when a democracy becomes an oligarchy—which corresponds to the more dramatic sense 
of “revolution” that coincides with the common understanding of the term. However, Aristotle also 
argues that there is a second way in which revolutions can occur: when a great enough change within 
one and the same system is brought about, for example when there is a change from a weak democracy 
to a strong one (Aristotle, 2014, Book V, I, 4-5). The same holds in the context of animal rights. These 
rights can be promoted not only by adopting new legal arguments and instruments, but also by 
strengthening, refining and repurposing existing ones.   
Overcoming Old Rifts 
Ignorance of the existence of these two different types of revolution has, we believe, caused a signifi-
cant rift in animal rights law, which is illustrated in the long-standing debates between the so-called 
animal welfarists and abolitionists. Abolitionists have usually styled themselves as the true revolution-
aries; as the only ones who advocate the abolition of laws and practices that treat animals as mere 
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commodities. Welfarists, on the other hand, have generally been viewed as the more pragmatic re-
formers, whose primary aim is to work from within the system to improve the legal protection of 
animals’ wellbeing (see Francione and Garner, 2010).  
To be sure, some welfarists have adopted a middle ground position called “new welfarism”. Propo-
nents of this approach agree with the abolitionists’ goal to ultimately change animals’ status as objects 
rather than subjects of legal concern. But in contrast to abolitionists, new welfarists believe that “re-
formist” measures can get us there (Taylor, 1999). Despite the emergence of this new welfarism, how-
ever, welfarists have not been able to completely shed their reputation as being more matter-of-fact 
animal advocates when compared to their alleged opponents in the supposedly more progressive and 
hot-blooded abolitionist camp. 
In unison with other voices (e.g., Chiesa, 2016), we would like to suggest that the common division 
between welfarists and abolitionists—which we have exaggerated here to drive home our point—is 
problematic. This is so for at least three reasons. 
First, as the emergence of new welfarism has shown, there are significant overlaps not only in the 
ultimate goal of many welfarists and abolitionists to achieve a drastic change in animals’ legal status 
quo, but also some of the practical proposals which both would support to achieve this goal. Most 
importantly, new welfarists and abolitionists agree that, if done right, campaigns that focus on the 
banning of particularly problematic practices, such as cruel types of entertainment involving animals 
like bull-fighting (a topic that featured prominently in the Cambridge Conference) or circuses, are 
preferable to taking no action (Francione and Garner, 2010, pp. 78–79; for a critical perspective, see 
Wrenn and Johnson, 2013). 
A second reason for challenging the idea of a chasm between abolitionism and welfarism is that our 
understanding of many legal concepts and their relationship to animals is still rather deficient. Con-
cepts such as rights, personhood, subjecthood, property, dignity, or equal protection, can mean dif-
ferent things depending on who invokes them. For example, there is considerable disagreement in the 
literature on key questions such as whether or not animals already have legal rights by virtue of welfare 
legislation that protects their interests (see e.g., McCausland, 2014; Kurki, 2017; Wise, 1996); whether 
these rights are absolute or whether they could be balanced against other rights or the public (human) 
interest (see e.g., Cochrane, 2018, 25; Francione, 2005, p. 168); or whether animals could remain prop-
erty while possessing rights (see e.g., Wise, 1996, p. 180; Cochrane, 2009). As a result of these disa-
greements, a concrete practical proposal for legal change, such as for instance a bill requiring the 
provision of a stimulating environment for farmed pigs to improve their lives, would be viewed as an 
animal rights measure by some, while others would say it is the very opposite, because they take such 
different interpretations of what it means to have a right. All other things being equal, however, it is 
indisputable that the pigs would practically benefit from such a law. It seems to us that at least until 
we have acquired complete clarity as to what exactly it means for animals to possess (fundamental) 
rights or similar legal entitlements, any kind of pigeonholing that occurs with the use of labels such as 
welfarism and abolitionism should be avoided. 
Lastly, it is arguable that the rift between abolitionists and welfarists has been actively harmful to the 
cause of improving the wellbeing of nonhuman animals. The hard-nosed opposition between at least 
some abolitionists and (new) welfarists has meant that opportunities for joint campaigns attempting 
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to ban problematic practices involving animals were missed, and that resources went into the opposi-
tion itself rather than changing animals’ lives. To be sure, there are some that argue that factionalism 
within the animal rights movement has certain benefits. For example, it has been pointed out that 
factionalism can induce self-reflection on the part of the factions, and that it can motivate other people 
to become involved (Wrenn, 2018). However, it strikes us as obvious that a movement without in-
fighting is preferable to one with infighting.  
A Pragmatic Way Forward 
To overcome the old rift between welfarists and abolitionists, a pragmatic approach is necessary which 
looks at what measures, concretely, promote the legal status quo of animals in a way that takes these 
animals seriously as having vital interests worthy of a similar kind of protection that we accord to 
human interests. This, essentially, is the approach that the Cambridge Centre for Animal Rights Law 
adopts, and which was reflected in the diverse contributions of our Conference participants.2 
In addition to reflecting a pragmatist approach to animal rights, these contributions were also an im-
portant step in the establishment of animal rights law as a legal discipline in its own right. Let us briefly 
elaborate on this. 
Until now, animal rights law was largely a part-discipline. Its scholars and practitioners were all con-
centrating their efforts on different issues: some were focused on philosophical questions or questions 
of animal cognition, others on issues of practical implementation, and yet others on animal rights as a 
movement. Like the blind men in the parable of the elephant, they appeared to think that the parts of 
the “elephant” they addressed were all there was to it.  
In recent years, these parts have finally started coming together as a single discipline of animal rights 
law. Our own experiences in the Cambridge Centre for Animal Rights Law have reinforced the view 
that animal rights law is now a discipline in its own right. In our course on Animal Rights Law given 
in the Law Faculty of the University of Cambridge, we cover the social and historical context, the 
development of the (mostly animal welfare) laws and their status quo in the UK and internationally, 
jurisprudential issues, animal rights case law, and questions about law reform. As we show in the 
course, all these parts belong together. 
This is not to say, of course, that animal rights law is detached from other disciplines. Quite the con-
trary: animal rights law will remain in important parts an interdisciplinary endeavor, making it neces-
sary for animal rights lawyers to be versed in philosophy, litigation tactics, animal behavior, etc. How-
ever—and this is our point—animal rights lawyers are beginning to focus more on the special charac-
teristics of law, and the possibilities that the application of tools that are unique to law offer for the 
protection of animals’ interests. For example, legal animal rights are not the same as moral rights; to 
be a person from the point of view of the philosophy of mind is not the same as to be a legal person; 





Foundation, 2019), but not necessary for it to be granted a constitutional right to bodily integrity, and 
so on. 
Animal rights practitioners, we believe, have been aware of this point for longer than some scholars 
have. An anecdote from the Talking Animals, Law & Philosophy series, also organized at Cambridge, 
nicely illustrates this point. In April 2018, Steven Wise, the president of the US-based Nonhuman 
Rights Project (NhRP), was in Cambridge to talk about the work of the NhRP on nonhuman animal 
legal personhood. After Wise had finished his talk, Professor Matthew Kramer, Professor in Legal and 
Political Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, raised his hand and asked Wise what theory of 
legal personhood he himself endorsed. Wise’s answer—after some back and forth—turned out to be 
surprisingly simple (we are paraphrasing): “whatever the judge’s definition of legal personhood is be-
fore whom I am arguing my case, that is my definition of legal personhood”. 
Finally, and connected to this last thought, a few words on why the Cambridge Centre for Animal 
Rights Law organized the first European (rather than international) Animal Rights Law Conference. 
Unlike other disciplines, law—despite the existence of inter- and supranational institutions—is still to 
a significant extent a national matter, with many local idiosyncrasies and a confusing jumble of juris-
diction-specific competences—as, we are sure, any law student would readily confirm. But while there 
are important dissimilarities between the animal laws of different European states, there are also im-
portant similarities—not least thanks to the European Union and the Council of Europe (see e.g., 
Broom, 2017; Brels, 2017). 
To build much-needed capacities not only in animal rights law scholarship, but also in animal rights 
law practice, it therefore seemed logical to us at the Cambridge Centre for Animal Rights Law to first 
leverage existing European synergies. The mission of the Centre, however, is not only to draw together 
what already exists but, more importantly, to help build a European community of animal rights law-
yers and thereby to generate new synergies in order to create a European animal rights law. 
The Centre’s hope is that, with the support of our donors, we will be able to run the European Animal 
Rights Law Conference on an annual basis and, in conjunction with the Centre’s other activities,3 to 
be able to work as a catalyst for animal rights law in Europe and, perhaps at some point, around the 
world. 
Conclusion 
Animal rights law is emerging as an academic discipline in its own right. Although it is connected to 
other disciplines, animal rights law has developed its own specialist scholarship and its own practical 
attempts at implementing rights for animals. The Cambridge Conference was thus part of a broader 
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trend in scholarship and legal practice. Still, in being the first to bring together European experts in 
that field, it contributed its share to what we might call the dawn of European animal rights law. 
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